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CONTRACT MAKING AND PAROL EVIDENCE:
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF A
SICK RULE
Justin Sweett
The parol evidence rule determines the provability of a prior or
contemporaneous oral agreement when the parties have assented to a
written agreement. Courts expect this apparently simple rule to accom-
plish many objectives. Doubting the trustworthiness of evidence con-
cerning prior oral agreements, and fearful that fact-finders will not
appreciate the need for stability and certainty in commercial dealings,'
some courts expect the rule to improve the quality of judicial resolu-
tion of disputes.2 This is done by precluding finders of fact, especially
juries, from considering evidence of such "agreements." Other courts
gee the rule as insisting that agreements be expressed in proper form.3
lFinally, some see the rule as a method of protecting an intention to
integrate a transaction into one final and complete repository.4
This "simple" rule is in fact a maze of conflicting tests, subrules,
and exceptions adversely affecting both the counseling of clients and
the litigation process. Whether the rule has played a significant role in
inducing contracting parties to put their entire agreement into one final
writing is, at best, doubtful.
The only proper function of the parol evidence rule is to protect
truly integrated writings. To achieve this result, both bench and bar
must be convinced that the present Rule can no longer be tolerated.
t" Professor of Law, University Of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. The author expresses his appreciation for the many helpful com-
ments regarding this paper made by his colleagues, Professors David W. Louisell, Ronan
E. Degnan, Melvin A. Eisenberg and Herbert Bernstein, and by Professor Stewart Macaulay
of the University of Wisconsin Law School. Miss Patricia Muszynski, a second-year law
student at Berkeley, provided invaluable research assistance.
1 Cf. G.L. Webster Co. v. Trinidad Bean & Elev. Co., 92 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1937); Jones
v. Guilford Mortgage Co., 120 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Texas Midland R.R. v.
Hurst, 262 S.W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Godbey & Sons Constr. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal.
2d 429, 435, 256 P.2d 946, 950 (1952) (Schauer, J., dissenting).
2 E.g., Masterson v. Sine, - Cal. 2d - , 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968). See
also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comment 3 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
3 Jones v. Guilford Mortgage Co., 120 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Texas
Midland R.R. v. Hurst, 262 S.W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
4 E.g., United States v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966); Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Thompson, 273 F.2d 396 (8th' Cir. 1959); Baylor Univ. v. Carlander,
316 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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Further, a set of guidelines must be provided that can assist the courts
in determining whether a particular writing is truly integrated. Em-
phasis must be upon the contract-making and not the judicial process.
I
THE PARoL EVIDENCE -RuLE IN THE COURTS: SOME
HIGHLIGHTS AND IMPRESSIONS
Though the complexity of the parol evidence rule makes thor-
ough discussion impossible, even a brief look reveals the inconsistent
character of the rule.
A. Varying Tests for Determining Intention to Integrate
Those cases stressing integration as the basis for the parol evidence
rule use different tests to determine whether the parties intended to
integrate their entire transaction into one final writing. Some decisions
permit the trial judge to examine only the writing in determining
whether it is integrated.5 These courts look for apparent "complete-
ness" in deciding whether they will admit any evidence of prior agree-
ments. Other courts6 and the Uniform Commercial Code7 permit the
judge to look beyond the writing to determine whether there was an
intention to integrate.
Written contracts often contain provisions stating that. the written
agreement is a final integration or that the writing is the whole or entire
contract between the parties. Such clauses usually control the question
of intention to integrate, unless the writing itself is successfully attacked
for fraud, duress, mistake or any other reason showing that no valid
agreement had been formed.8 Since these clauses are often part of a
standardized, printed form contract with adhesion overtones, some
decisions have refused to give them literal effect or have interpreted
them narrowly.9
5 Eg., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrig. Co., 141 US. 510, 517 (1891); Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bird
Is. Produce, Inc., 249 Minn. 137, 82 N.W.2d 48 (1957).
6 United States v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 265 F.2d 609, 618-14 (8d Cir. 1966);
Atlantic N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953).
7 UCC § 2-202, Comment 3.
8 E.g., Rafferty v. Butler, 133 Md. 430, 105 A. 530 (1919); Armour Fertilizer Works v.
Hyman, 120 S.C. 375, 113 S.E. 330 (1922); see 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 578 (1960) [herein-
after cited as CoRBIN].
9 E.g., Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v, Johnson, 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967);
International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955).
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B. Extent of Integration:: Partial Integration and Consistent Collateral
Agreements
It is often possible to 'augment a Writing de"s'i t eparol evidence
rule and despite what appears to be a complete writing. Sometimes
it can be contended successfully that only a part of the transaction has
been integrated.' 0
Empl ying a rationale similar to that of the concept of partial
integration, some courts permit a party to show evidence of a consistent
prior or ,contemporaneous collateral agreement."- If such evidence is
admitted and believed, the party,, in effect, has been permitted to "add
to" but not to "vary or contradict" the writing.
Application of the "consistency" test requires a difficult excursion
into interpretation. Determining the extent of integration or what is
"collateral" is equally difficult. In order for an agreement to be collat-
eral, the Restatement requires a different-subject matter and a separate
consideration, or a prior agreement which might naturally have been
made as a separate agreement.'12 Wihston asks whether it would have
been normal and natural for the parties to have made both oral and
written agreements,13 McCormick varies this slightly by suggesting that
we look at whether it wo4ild be natural and normal for the parties to
have included the asserted oral agreement in the writing had it been
made and intended to stand.14 The Uniform Commercial Code, in a
comment, ,states the test to be whether "if agreed upon, [the parties]
would certainly have... included- [the alleged agreementj in the' docu-
ment."' 5 Wigmor. says 'that adlissibility depends upon whether the
particular subject was "dealt with" in the writing. 16 The varying tests
and the difficulty of their application have resulted in uneven applica-
tion of the consistent collateral aMd partial integration rules.17
Admissibility. of evidence also may depend upon whether the-prior
"deal" was a warranty, a representation or a promise. Some courts seem
10 E.g., United States v. Clementon Sewerage Auth., 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966);
Henika v. Lange, 55 Cal. App. 336, 203 P. 798 (1921); see 3 Comm § 581.
11 E.g., Greathouse v. Daleno, 57 Cal. App. 187, 206 P. 1019 (1922); see 3 ,CoiN § 583.
12 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240' (1932).
3S 4 IS. WiUsTON, 'CONTRACrS § 638 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIL-sON].
14 C. McCoaMicK, EvmaNcE § 216, at 441 (1954) [hereinafter cited as M1cCon MicK.
15 UCC § 2-202, ,Comment&. - 'I.,
16.9 J. WIGMORIE, EVMENCM §2430, at 99 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORF].
'7 E.g., Dillon v. Sumner, 153 Cal. App. 2d 639, 315 P.2d 84 (1957); Greathouse v.
Daleno, 57 Cal. App. 187, 206 P.,.1019 (1922)., , ",.
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more inclined to permit-, evidence- of: representations than promises.4's
The theory seems to be that parties. do ,not normally integrate repre-
sentations, but they do integrate, promises. Put another way, ,we can
expect parties to put promises in writing but even a prudent dontractirig
party may not include representations.. Warranties, much like promises
in importance, seem harder to get into evidence,, especially if there is
an express'warranty in thewriting.l 4, -,:, - .;0, , .:
With typical parol evidence rule inconsistency, solhd, courts hold
that implications of law'are integrated and cannot b& *aried by parol
evidence.20 But even those codrts which- hold that .implications of law
cannot be "contradicted" sometimes 'admit evidence of a prior ioral
agreement to determine "reasonableness." 2' , ,
C.' Pa ol Evidence Can Sho, No' Valid Contract Made
The parol evidence rule is predicated upon the assumption that the
parties have entered into a valid agreeient; a party is always'permitted
to show that no valid agreement was made.22 Validity'is attacked by
allegations. that consent-was obtained through fragd, mistake, or duress,
or that the writing was a, sham and was never intended, to constitute an
enforceable agreement.23 Also, the parties are permitted to -show that
there was no consideration for the contract.2 , ,The defect-in-formation
cases have developed a complex set of ;subrules and exceptions that
equals the parol evidence rule itself in unevenness of application and
confusion.2 5
D. Oral Agreements Relating to Delivery and Conditions
Two well-known routes for avoiding tie arol evidence rule are
't.
related to the defect-in-formation concept. They are conditional delivery
and oral conditions. Conditional delivery usually relates to -the manual
18 Richard v. Baker, 141 Cal. App. 2d 857, 297 P.2d 674 (1956); Shyvers v. Mitchell,
133 Cal. App. 2d 569, 284 P.2d 826 (1955).
19 Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N.W, 1 (1885); k WiLuLIsroN § 643.
20 See 4 WMswION § 640.
21 Id. But see California Drilling & Mach. Co. v. Crowder, 58 Cal. ,App. 529, 209 P.' 68
(1922).
22 3 CoBiN § 577.
23 Id. at § 580; see Thompson v. Price, - Cal. App. 2d -,59 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1967),
where parol evidence was admitted to show the defendant's elaborate scheme of fraud,
rather than to invalidate the contract as written. I ,
L .4 E.g. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co, v. Utne, 207,F. Supp; 521 (D. Minn. 1962); Sweeney V.
KANS, Inc., 247 Cal. App. 2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1966); Strickland v. Hetherington, 353
P.2d 138 (Okla. 1960). J
25 See Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAIW. L. REv. 877(1961) . .. . " - ,
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transfer of deeds or other formal instruments with an alleged oral condi-
tion to the delivery. In many jurisdictions, proof of such conditional
delivery may be shown even if the instrument appears to be uncondi-
tional on its face.26
Sometimes evidence is permitted to prove an oral condition al-
though that condition does not relate to delivery of an instrument. Pym
v. Camp bet 9 held that one party can by oral testimony show that a
contract which appears complete is subject to an oral condition of
approval by a third party.28 The court stated that a party can show that
no valid contract was ever made. Despite the "no contract" theory, a
court usually will not admit evidence if the alleged oral condition is
held to be inconsistent with the writing.29 Also, if some conditions are
expressed in the writing, courts sometimes refuse to permit evidence
of an additional oral condition. 0
E. Doctrines Relating to Consideration
The parol evidence rule does not preclude a showing of absence
of consideration. Also, the existence of a separate consideration is one
test for determining collateralness of a parol agreement. There are
other methods of using consideration to avoid the parol evidence rule.
Courts sometimes permit evidence concerning an antecedent or con-
temporaneous agreement by permitting a party to show the true con-
sideration.3' Usually these cases involve a fictitious purchase-price
recital in a deed made for reasons of secrecy. Also, there may be a ficti-
tious recital that money has changed hands for the purchase of an option
in order to make the option irrevocable.32 Other cases have allowed one
party to show that what appears to be a deed is a mortgage.33
26 3 CoRBIN § 587. But in some states a deed absolute on its face cannot be shown to
be subject to an oral condition after delivery is made to the grantee. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 12.66 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
27 6 El. & B1. 370, 119 Eng. Rep. 903 (Q.B. 1856).
28 Some courts distinguish between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.
Dunne Ford Sales, Inc. v. Continental Assur. Co., 221 F. Supp. 975 (D.R.I. 1963); Nutrena
Mills, Inc. v. Yoder, 187 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Iowa 1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1961).
In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 274 F. Supp. 566 (D. Del. 1967) an oral condition was shown,
but evidence thereon was not admitted because of an integration clause. Contra, Luther
Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A-2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). See also 3 CORBIN § 589.
29 E.g., Stafford v. Russell, 116 Cal. App. 2d 326, 255 P.2d 814 (1953).
30 E.g., United Eng'r & Contract. Co. v. Broadnax, 136 F. 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
197 U.S. 624 (1905); Travers-Newton Chautauqua Sys. v. Naab, 196 Iowa 1313, 196 N.W. 36
(1923).
31 See 3 COPDIN § 586; Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 34 Del. Ch. 249, 102 A.2d
538 (Sup. Ct. 1954); contra, Cassilly v. Cassilly, 57 Ohio St. 582, 49 N.E. 795 (1897).
32 E.g., Raymer v. Hobbs, 26 Cal. App. 298, 146 P. 906 (1915); Combs v. Turner, 304
Ky. 179, 200 S.W.2d 288 (1947).
33 E.g., Stambaugh v. Silverheels, 188 Kan. 124, 360 P.2d 1078 (1961); cf. Wadleigh v.
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In separation agreements, legal issues may depend upon whether
money payments are alimony or child support or part of a property
settlement. Some courts have permitted a party to pierce a label while
others have not.3 4 Courts also sometimes confuse failure of considera-
tion with lack of consideration, usually resulting in admission of evi-
dence concerning a prior oral agreement.35
F. Interpretation
One of the principal ways of avoiding the parol evidence rule is
to assert that evidence of the prior oral agreement should. be received
merely to interpret or explain a writing and that the evidence does not
add to, vary, or contradict the written agreement. 36 Usually the party
attempting to introduce such extrinsic evidence must first show that the
writing is ambiguous and does not have a meaning "plain on its face."37
If the court wishes to determine what the parties intended when they
used certain language, evidence of an oral agreement relating to the
crucial area can be very helpful. Although evidence of the parol agree-
ment may be weighed with all other evidence relating to interpretation,
if the agreement is admitted, it is likely to control the interpretation
question. In this fashion, evidence of a prior agreement, if believed,
could determine the obligation of the contracting parties.
"Private code" cases illustrate the narrow line between interpreta-
tion and integration. In such cases, one party attempts to show that there
was a prior agreement that the terms in a written contract were to have
a "private" and not a "usual" meaning. Some courts permit such private
Phelps, 149 Cal. 627, 87 P. 93 (1906); Campbell v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653,
74 N.W.2d 546 (1956).
4 Egan v. Egan, - Cal. App. 2d - , 59 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1967) (holding labels not
conclusive); Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal. App. 2d 190, 3 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1960) (holding that
parties cannot go behind language to determine whether a discharge in bankruptcy was
intended to provide alimony and support).
35 E.g., Mihojevich v. Harrod, 214 Cal. App. 2d 360, 29 Cal. Rptr. 440, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 887 (1963). Pronzato v. Guerrina, 400 Pa. 521, 163 A.2d 297 (1960). Lack of con-
sideration means the agreement was not binding. Failure of consideration means one party
has not received the bargained-for exchange and can discharge his obligation to proceed
further. In the Mihojevich case a grantee retransferred title to mining claims to the
grantor. The grantee contended that it was agreed orally that in exchange for the re-
transfer and certain acts, the grantor would pay the grantee one-half of anything re-
covered in a condemnation action. The evidence was admitted "to prove such failure
[of consideration]." 214 Cal. App. 2d at 363, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 442. This was a case of the
failure of consideration being in the performance promised by the alleged oral agreement.
It had nothing to do with the validity of the contract.
36 3 CoPmiN § 579; MCCORMICK § 217.
37 McCoaiucK § 219.
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codes and others do not."" When such evidence is admitted; the net re-
sult is that the writings are found to have contained only part of the
agreement and not the entire agreement. Yet, the problem is usually
treated as one of interpretation.,
G. Reformation .
Equity offers still another method of avoiding the parol evidence
rule.39 The expanding remedy of reformation permits the court to
judicially correct the writing-if, because of fraud or mistake, the final
writing does not reflect the actualagreement of the parties. The fraud
or mistake usually occurs in the process'of reducing the agreement to
writing, but in some cases it relates to the conduct of the parties during
n egotiatiQns.40 Reformation goes beyond the negative effect of denying
the validity of the contract since it results in enforcement of the alleged
oral agreement.
H. Not Applicable to Modifications"
The parol evidence rule does not apply to agreements made subse-
quent to a writing. Only statutory41 or contractualrulesofform
relating to iiodification govern subsequent agreements. If a party carn
siow that a parol agreement was renewed after' the writing, he" will not
run into the parol evidence rule .4
I. Some Unique Techniques Recently Observed
New and utique methods of avoiding the parol evidence rule
continually'appear. One interesting techinique is the unilateral contract
concept. In a recent case, the purchaser of a car tried to enforce a car
dealer's newspaper advertisement. The purchaser signed a written
purchase agreement which did not include the terms of the advertise-
mentbut did. contain an integration clause. The court held that when
the buyer purchased the car he completed the act requested by the
38. E.g., Associated Lathing & Plastering Co. v. Louis C. Dunn, Inc., 185' Cal. App. 2d
40, 286 P:2d 825"(1955y, Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728, 110 Eng. Rep; 266 (K.B. 1882). See
$ Coamr § 579-at 426. . 1 1
39 8 ConikN§ 614; Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 Mics. L. REv.
833 (1967)..
40 E.g., Olson Constr .Co. v. United States, '75 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Hugo v.
Erickson, 110 Neb. 602, 194 N.W. 728 (1923); Whipple v. Brown Bros., 225 N.Y. 237, 121,
N.E. 748 (1919); Superior Distrib. Corp. v. fargrove, 312 P.2d, 893- (Okla. "!957).' See also
Palmer, supra note 39.' , . .'
41 E.g., CAL.' Civ. CoDE § 1698 (West 1954).-
42 A statement in the contract that modifications must be in witing will be enforced
if signed separately by the other party. UCC § 2-209(2). -,
48 Most jurisdictions require consideration for modification.
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advertisement. 4 The unilateral contract concept avoided having to
deal with the integration clause and the parol evidence rule.
In another case; an antecedent oral agreement was -admitted
through introduction of the deposition of an empl6yee of the 'opposing
party.45 In the deposition, the witness stated; that the parties had agreed
upon certain terms -orally., It appeared that no objection based upon
parol evidence was made, but the deposition was admitted under: the
admission-against-interest exception to' the hearsay rule. By cloaking
the testimony in the guise of an admission, the p arity was able to avoid
the parol evidence rule.
J. Procedural Problems
The first procedural 'problem involving the,parol. evidence rule
relates to choice of law. If the litigation is in federal court, should the
court apply a federal choice of law rule relating to parol evidence, or
should it apply'the choice of law rule of the state in which the court sits?
Once this detepimination is made, would the appropriate choice of laW
rule, state or federal, apply the parol evidence rule of the irum or that
of the state where the agreement took place? If an action is brought in
the state courts, should the forum apply its own parol evidence rule or
that of some other state connected with the.transaction? For these pur-
poses, most decisions hold that the parol evidence rule relates to
substance and not to procedure.46 This means a federal court sitting in
California will apply the California choice of law rule, which utilizes
the law of the state where the transaction occurred.
Some courts hold, however, despite the supposed substantive nature
of the rule for choice of law purposes, that failure to object waives any
parol evidence issue being raised on appeal.47 A recent ease held that if
one party testified to an asserted oral agreement, he could not later
objectto the other party testifying on the same matter.48
Statute of limitations problems can arise in the context of the
parol evidence rule. In California there is a four-year period of limita-
tions forobligations founded on a writing,49 while other contractual
44 Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
45 H. K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp. of America, 367 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966).
46 E.g., Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v., Oregon. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Ore. 407; 408 P.2d 198
(1965); see H. GOODRICH & E. ScoLMs, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89 (1964); McCoRMIcK § 213.
47 E.g., Pao Ch'en Lee v. Gregoriou, 50 Cal. 2d 502, 326 P.2d 135 (1958);.see MCCORMICK
§ 213, note 2; but'see United States v: Croft-Mullins Elec. Co., 333 F.2d 1772, 779 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965).
, 48 Carpenson v. Najarian, - Cal.' App. 2d -- , 62 Cal. Rptr. 687, 697 (1967);
see Bandy v. Myers, 227 N.E.2d 183, 187 (Ind. App. 1967).
49 CAL. Cxv. PRO. CODE § 27 (West Supp . 1967).
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obligations are subject to a two-year period of limitations.50 Suppose
one party is permitted to offer into evidence testimony of an antecedent
oral agreement? The transaction is then partly oral and partly written.
If the lawsuit is related to the failure to perform the oral agreement,
does the two-year or the four-year period of limitations apply?
Finally, who decides whether the parties have integrated their
entire transaction in a writing? Most courts and commentators state
that this determination should be made by the trial court judge.51 On
the other hand, Corbin and a few decisions hold that the issue should
be treated in the same way as any other issue of fact.52
K. Hazards of Litigation Prediction
Although there are many ways of avoiding the parol evidence
rule, the rule is by no means dead. The techniques mentioned are not
available for avoiding the parol evidence rule with equal ease in every
jurisdiction.53 Many cases deny admissibility of the agreement and
phrase the rule in vigorous, absolute terms. However, precedents may
be ignored or distinguished on insubstantial grounds, leading to par-
allel lines of authority. The different policies behind the rule have
varying degrees of persuasiveness in different fact situations. The cease-
less flow of parol evidence opinions and the refusal of courts to give the
real reasons for their decisions contribute to litigation prediction diffi-
culties.
II
EFFECT OF THE RULE ON COUNSELING, LITIGATION
AND CONTRACT MAKING
A. Counseling Clients
Clients frequently ask their attorneys:
1. Can I enforce a prior oral promise made by the other party if I
50 Id. § 339.
51 E.g., Charles A. Wright, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co., 354 F.2d 710, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1966);
Gibson v. United States, 268 F.2d 586, 588-89 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal. App.
2d 190, 197, 3 Cal. Rptr. 50, 55 (1960). See McCoRmicK § 219; 9 WIGMORE § 2430, at 98; 4
WIISTON § 638, 639.
52 Brazil v. Dupree, 197 Ore. 581, 598, 254 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1953); Cobb v. Wallace, 45
Tenn. 539, 544 (1868); 3 CORBIN § 595.
53 See Chadbourn & McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9
N.C.L. REv. 151, 154 (1931); Degnan, Parol Evidence-The Utah Version, 5 UTAH L. REV.
158, 179 (1956); McDonough, Parol Evidence Rule in South Dakota and the Effect of
Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 S.D.L. REv. 60, 61 (1965); Note, Parol
Evidence Rule; The Advent of the Uniform Commercial Code in Iowa, 52 IoWA L. REv. 512
(1966); Note, The Parol Evidence Rule in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 269 (1962); Note, A
Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule in Pennsylvania, 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 703 (1952).
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didn't include it in the writing? What would be my chances in
court? Would you advise a settlement?
2. Will the law enforce an oral promise which the other party
claims I made when no such promise is in the written contract?
What are my chances of winning if I am sued? Do you suggest
settlement?
3. How can I protect myself from false claims of prior oral "agree-
ments" when a written contract is made?
4. Can a printed paragraph in a contract stating that "this is the
only agreement between the parties" shield a person when he
has made a prior oral agreement that I have relied on?
Can a lawyer, by digging into the facts and reading some law come
with reliable answers? The answer is clearly "no". The deceptive
simplicity of the rule hides a bewildering network of subrules and
exceptions. Naive attorneys read a few strong judicial pronouncements
about the salutary nature of the rule and believe that parol evidence is
not admissible to "add to, vary, or contradict a written agreement."
They are unaware of cases critical of the rule and of ways of "han-
dling" the rule. Many lawyers are slightly more sophisticated about
the rule, having read many cases but not quite enough. They have
seen the rule avoided so many times that they believe it is dead. Con-
scientious attorneys are often simply bewildered by the mass of conflict-
ing decisions and variant statements of the rule. They may realize that
they must develop the facts, but they do not know what are the critical
facts since judicial opinions rarely state them. Many confuse the rule
with the Statute of Frauds and the best evidence rule.
Intelligent attorneys should conclude that the proponent of the
oral agreement will be permitted to prove it if the trial judge thinks it
likely that the agreement was made and if there are no cogent reasons
why it should not be enforced. If there is a well-drafted integration
clause,5" counsel should conclude that the oral agreement will not
be provable unless:
(1) There is some formation defect which makes the entire writing
unenforceable; or
(2) The writing has strong elements of adhesion or mistake and it
appears the agreement was made and should be enforced.
Such conclusions are equivocal and often unsatisfactory to the
client. But the conclusions are generally accurate. Unfortunately, many
attorneys will be dogmatic and frequently wrong.
54 See 3 CoRBIN § 578; Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule,
27 TExAs L. RFV. 361, 362-65 (1949).
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B. Litigation
In addition to litigation prediction difficulties, there are other
problems that the parol evidence rule has brought to the litigation
process. A number of tactical problems are caused by the rule. In order
to avoid a waiver, attorneys will object to any testimony concerning an
asserted antecedent or contemporaneous agTeement when the parties
have assented to a writing. Such an objection often takes the form of
stating that even if the agreement were made, it cannot be proved. If the
objecting attorney loses on the question of admissibility, he often tries to
prove that the agreement never took place. A jury may have difficulty
making the transition from assuming the agreement made for purposes
of admissibility to deciding that no agreement was ever made.
Also, the instinctive reaction of lawyers to object to such testimony
often diffuses tactical energies which should be directed elsewhere. If
the attorney has a very flimsy parol evidence argument he might better
concentrate his efforts on persuading the jury that there never was an
agreement, that it was not intended to be binding, that it was dis-
charged by assent to the writing, or that the law should not enforce it
even if it were made. If he is convinced the court will find some en-
forceable agreement, he should concentrate on interpretation. Too
often his argument is based solely on admissibility, and he is not ade-
quately prepared to handle these other issues.
The quality of judicial decision making suffers from poor handling
of parol evidence issues. Attorneys with good facts for permitting proof
of the prior oral agreement often do an inadequate job of presenting
their case, while attorneys with good facts for denying proof of the
agreement are often unable to present their contentions skillfully.
Although the outcome of a case is often correct because courts, as
a rule, have a good sense of fairness, there are cases that simply come out
wrong. There are non-result-oriented judges who mechanically follow
cases phrasing the Rule in its traditional form. Other judges, believing
the Rule expresses a sound judicial policy, may refuse to admit the
testimony of the oral agreement even if they believe the agreement took
place and was intended to stand.55
Thus, the judicial process will not look very good to the litigants
or the attorneys in parol evidence cases. The by-product of almost every
parol evidence dispute is a client who is angry either because he
has not been given his day in court or because the opposing party has
been permitted to prove an oral agreement that the client claims was
not made and which his attorney assured him could not be proven.
55 See, e.g.. McGamv v. General Elcc. Supply Corp., 185 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1950);
Mitterhausen v. South Wis. Conf. Ass'n, 245 Wis. 353, 14 N.V.2d 1 (1944).
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The administration of justice also suffers because of the parol
evidence rule. Almost every parol evidence case involves lengthy and
often fruitless bickering on the part of the attorneys. Much time .s spent
trying to unravel the intricacies of the rule. In addition, because the
rule is phrased in admissibility terms, there is a substantial chance of a
reversal of trial court decisions because the rule is often as misunder-
stood by appellate courts as by trial courts.
C. Contract Making
Some of the parol evidence rule's adverse effect on counseling
and litigation might be excusable if the rule caused contracting parties
to put their entire agreement in the writing. But the rule has not had
this effect. The volume of parol evidence cases in the appellate reports
indicates that there are many part oral, part written agreements5  A
recent unpublished study of architectural contracting practices shows
that such agreements are quite common in transactions between archi-
tects and their clients.57 Further studies would probably show a similar
contract-making pattern in other types of transactions.
When parties do place their entire agreement in one final writing,
they are more concerned with efficient contract administration and
objective proof of the "deal" if a dispute arises than they are with the
parol evidence rule.58 The rule has adversely affected counseling and
litigation without any evidence that it has induced parties to put their
entire agreements in writing.
III
DIAGNOSIS: Too MANY CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES FOR
ONE "SIMPLE" RULE
The parol evidence rule is expected to achieve a numbcr of debat-
able objectives that today are questionable.
586 In volumes 41-64 of the California Reporter, covering a period of slightly over
three years, there were 113 cases involving integration aspects of the parol evidence rule.
57 In a study by the author, 600 questionnaires were mailed to Northern California
members of the American Institute of Architects, of whom 287 responded. Project costs are
almost always discussed. Usually, there is a projected cost figure, varying in firmness. In
45% of the agreements the agreed figure was oral. Whether the fig-ure is firm or soft,
architects generally do not delete a cost disclaimer clause usually found in form contracts.
58 A more strict and consistent exclusion of prior oral agreements might have chan-
neled contract making into complete writings. But even this is doubtful.
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A. Failure of the Integration Concept as the Sole Rationale
To Wigmore, the only proper function of the parol evidence rule
is to give legal effect to an intention to make the writing the final and
complete repository of the transaction. 9 But the traditional way of
phrasing the rule shows that the integration concept has not preempted
the parol evidence field. The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
interpret a contract is still labeled a parol evidence question.10 Courts
state that admission of prior agreements would violate the parol evi-
dence rule,0 ' and speak of the law prohibiting oral testimony to vary,
add to, or contradict a written document. 2 This language, expressing
the concept that such testimony is untrustworthy and must not be
considered by the finders of fact, is inapposite to a rule dealing with
integrating antecedent understands into one final repository.
There are other illustrations of reluctance to accept Wigmore's
concept. Courts using the "face of the document" test manifest a dis-
trust of evidence outside the writing. It is a strange concept that phrases
a test in terms of intention and then proceeds to limit evidence of inten-
tion to the writing.63 This refusal to permit the trial judge to venture
beyond the writing shows a distrust of his ability to sift the wheat from
the chaff. Why require collateral agreements to be "consistent"? Is the
existence of the oral agreement doubtful? Do we distrust the jury? Why
must the judge determine whether the prior oral agreement would have
been normally and naturally included in the writing?64 If it was not
included in the writing when it is normal and natural to do so, is it
because it must not have been made? Why do some courts refuse to
permit evidence of an oral warranty when there is an express written
warranty even if there is no inconsistency? 5 Why do courts refuse to
listen to evidence of an oral condition if there are other written condi-
tions?66 Again, is it because they doubt the existence of such prior oral
agreements or because they distrust jurors?
Even in the defect-in-formation exceptions there are signs of dis-
59 9 WIGMORE § 2425.
60 Eg., Godfrey v. United States Cas. Co., 167 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. La. 1958); Lipp-
man v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 28 P.2d 775 (1955).
61 Eg., Vezaldenos v. Keller, 254 Cal. App. 2d -, 62 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967).
62 E.g., Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Steinberger
v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 140 P.2d 31 (1943).
63 Calamari & Perillo, Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of
Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333, 340 (1967).
64 See McCoRMICK § 216, at 441.
65 See p. 1039 & note 19 supra.
66 See p. 1040 & note 30 supra,
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trust of the evidence. In some jurisdictions, even when fraud is alleged,
it must be shown that the asserted oral agreement would not vary the
writing.67
A survey of the bench and bar would probably reveal a deep-seated
distrust of the ability of the judicial process to ferret out the truth when
confronted with contradictory testimony relating to an asserted oral
agreement. Lawyers rarely regard the rule as a device to protect an
integrated agreement. There are other indications that the integration
concept has not carried the day. Cases involving the parol evidence
rule are still prominent in evidence casebooks and treatises, and are
still classified under the evidence key number.68 Wigmore spends 247
pages on the rule after he states emphatically that it is not a rule of
evidence. Courts still refer to the parol evidence rule rather than some
rule dealing with contract making and the process of integration.
Why did Wigmore, and more recently Corbin, fail to persuade
bench and bar that integration should be the sole basis of the parol
evidence rule? First, the term "integration" is foreign to the linguistic
habits of most lawyers. Many draftsmen still label their integration
clauses as "Entire Contract," "Whole Contract," or "Merger" clauses.
Second, the legal profession was not given a good model of the
process of integration. Wigmore had a reasonably clear explanation, but
it was buried in the midst of other confusing discussion. 69 Courts and
scholars paid little attention to the contract-making process, the relative
bargaining power of the contracting parties, and the emergence of
standardized forms.
Third, the legal profession is conservative; it will not lightly dis-
card language with which it is both familiar and comfortable. There is
a biblical ring to the parol evidence rule when it is phrased in the
traditional manner: Parol evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or
contradict a written contract. This certainly sounds more legalistic than
the vague and the unfamiliar integration concept.
Fourth, lawyers have a strong distrust of the judicial process, espe-
cially the jury, as a means of ascertaining the truth. Fifth and finally,
the profession has never faced up to the adverse effects of the parol
evidence rule upon planning, counseling and litigating. To be sure,
many lawyers knew of its complexities and inconsistencies, but they did
67 E.g., Bank of America v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal. 2d 258, 48 P.2d 659 (1935) (parol
evidence admissible to show fraud in inducement of instrument but not to "vary" the
promises of the instrument itself).
68 See generally McCowasxcn §§ 210-22; M. LADD, CA ss ON EvmENcE 719-56 (1955).
69 9 WIGMORF § 2425.
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not realize its less obvious deficiencies. Many still think the rule does
some good,
B. Other Objectives of the Parol Evidence Rtle
Generally, the Statute of Frauds controls he form in which con-
tracts must be cast for affirmative enforcement.7 0 Certain transactions
require a sufficient memorandum signed by the party to be charged.
When some courts phrase the parol evidence rule in the traditional
manner, they are refusing enforcement of the parol agreement because
the parties have not used the proper form.
The parol evidence rule is designed, in the view of some judges
and lawyers, to promote justice in the courts. When one party relies
upon a written contract and the other claims upon an asserted oral
agreement varying the* written contract, perhaps the finders of fact can-
not be trusted to resolve the controversy. Oral testimony is viewed as
untrustworthy,71 and juries as either too soft or too gullible to give due
weight to the written contract. They may favor the underdog who rarely
has the writing on his side. They are too unsophisticated to appreciate
the need for commercial certainty and stability which protection of
writings should accomplish.
To a lesser degree, this vieW of the parol evidence rule manifests
some distrust for trial judges. Casting the rule as one of admissibility
gives an appellate court control over trial judges who might be as soft,
gullible or unsophisticated as a jury. Deference to the trial court's deter-
mination of credibility is not as strong in parol evidence cases as in
others.
The policy of protecting commercial writings is tied in with form
and control over the trial process. Fact finders may be trusted in ordi-
nary credibility cases, but not where there is a need to protect writings.
Much of the world's commerce is carried on through the use of
writings. Businessmen want to know their rights and duties in order to
plan rationally. Contracting organizations try to, insure that those who
conduct business on their behalf do not make commitments that exceed
their authority. Very likely some parol evidence opinions take this into
account when denying admissibility to prior oral agreements. Giving
the writing special protection can control unauthorized commitments
of agents and encourage third parties to make commitments based upon
the apparent completeness of a writing.
70 I am excluding the use of consideration as form. See geiperaIly Fuller, Con-
sideration and Form, 41 CoLum. L. RmV 199 (1941).
'71 Masterson v. Sine, - Cal. 2d -, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rpt.-545 (1968).
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Secrecy is often the reason a writing does not contain the entire agree-
ment of the parties. There is judicial distaste for such secret agreements
because of their propensity to harm third parties or the public.
There are a great many difficult issues that can be avoided by the
simple expedient of ruling on the basis of the parol evidence rule. The
authority of an agent, the vagueness of oral agreements, and the rele-
vance of oral conditions are typical of the complicated questions that
can be avoided by employing the rule. Also, if a trial judge doubts that
an asserted agreement ever took place, ruling on the basis of the parol
evidence rule avoids commenting on the evidence, instructing on the
weight and burden of proof, or granting a new trial. It also avoids
branding the witness a liar.
Many parol evidence cases involve difficult credibility questions.
An exasperated judge can use the rule to achieve a "plague on both
your houses" result. In effect the trial judge can state, "If you don't
take the trouble to give some objective evidence and save me from this
tough fact question, I just won't rule on it." Here the parol evidence
rule gives the judge a means of avoiding an issue which he would
rather not decide.
The rule is equally useful for attorneys approached by clients who
claim an oral agreement when they have subsequently assented to a
writing. If the attorney does not believe his client, or if the case is very
shaky, it is easy to advise the client not to sue because he is barred by the
parol evidence rule.
This plethora of objectives is at least partially responsible for the
Rule's adverse effect on counseling and litigation. Because these objec-
tives are not universally accepted today; and because they are looked
upon with varying degrees of approval, they place additional strains
on an already difficult rule.
IV
WHY PRECLUDE PROOF OF PRIOR ORAL AGREEMENTS?
The parol evidence rule relates to claimed agreements. Whether
the arbiter of a parol evidence dispute is a court, a commercial arbi-
trator, a precinct captain, or a respected member of the neighborhood,
three basic issues emerge:
(1) Was the asserted agreement made?
(2) Is there any reason not to enforce it?
(3) If it should be enforced, how should it be interpreted?
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Concerning the existence of the agreement, the nonjudicial dispute
arbiter will consider the credibility of witnesses and any evidence rele-
vant to that issue. He will consider the reasons why the subsequent
writing did not contain the prior oral agreement and will determine
whether the oral agreement is consistent with the written agreement.
He will look at subsequent acts of the parties and will determine
whether it is likely that parties situated as these were would have made
the oral agreement. But he looks at these things not to determine
whether he should consider the agreement, but to determine whether
the agreement took place. If the written agreement states the price to be
$1,000, it is not likely he will believe an asserted oral agreement that
the price was to be $10,000 for the same goods or performance. Only
if he is convinced by persuasive evidence or a good reason why the
parties wrote the price as $1,000 when they really agreed to $10,000,
would he believe that the asserted oral agreement was made.
If he believes there was an agreement, there may be adequate
reasons not to enforce it. The parties may have intended to change or
cancel their earlier agreement by assent to a subsequent writing. The
person making the agreement may not have had the authority to make
it. The dispute arbiter might not enforce the agreement because it is
illegal or contrary to his sense of propriety. If made and enforceable,
the arbiter will have to interpret the prior agreement and fit it into the
subsequent written agreement.
This simple model of dispute resolution should be contrasted with
a judicial resolution of such a dispute.
A. Was the Asserted Agreement Made?
Some courts consider the parol evidence rule a rule of form.72 In
determining whether the agreement was made, a court can look only at
reliable evidence. Testimony concerning an asserted oral agreement
72 For convenience of discussion the Statute of Frauds has been classified as a "rule
of form." For choice of law purposes it may be necessary to decide whether the Statute is
substantive or procedural. Also, it may be necessary to decide whether compliance with
the form specified in the Statute is required before any effect can be given to the transac-
tion. In such cases it may be necessary to decide whether the Statute effects "validity" of
the contract or merely relates to the method by which it can be "proved."
For choice of law purposes, the Statute is classified as substantive. See 2 CORBIN
§§ 293-94. Yet an oral agreement of a type "required" to be evidenced by a sufficient
memorandum creates certain legal relationships. It can be the basis for restitution and
sometimes actions based upon reliance. Minsky's Follies, Inc. v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1953). It can be used defensively. 2 CORBIN §§ 296-300. The Statute as a defense is waived
unless pleaded. A subsequent memorandum can satisfy the Statute.
The term "rule of form" was chosen to describe a rule which sets forth some require-
ments of form before the entire legal range of protection will be given to a transaction.
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cannot be considered because the agreement, if made, was not expressed
in proper form,
This rationale for the parol evidence rule can be evaluated by
an examination of the Statute of Frauds. Ideally, the Statute, as a rule
of form, should reduce litigation by informing potential litigants of the
legal enforceability of their contract, permit judicial resolution without
a trial, and avoid lengthy and difficult trials which result when the
existence of an agreement is disputed. In addition, the Statute was
meant to improve the quality of judicial dispute resolution. Credibility
questions could be kept from inexpert juries and softhearted or biased
trial judges. A rule of form assumes that parties generally follow, formal
rules. The absence of proper form indicates it is unlikely that the agree-
ment was made. Also, a rule of form assumes that witnesses will lie or
forget facts if it is to their advantage to do so. Such a rule assumes people
have poor memories and that litigation is an inefficient method of
ascertaining facts.
Has this particular rule of form worked? The history of the Statute
is well known. Legislatures strengthen and expand it,73 while courts
and attorneys develop innumerable methods of circumventing its provi-
sions.74 Statute of Frauds cases are too numerous to count.7 5 Although
the Statute may have channeled some contract making into written
forms, there 4re certainly more cogent reasons why some contracts are
expressed in writing. Parties may feel bound by such formality and be
more likely to perform after signing a written contract. In this sense,
getting the other party to sign is like receiving earnest money. Also,
contract administration and performance should be smoother and more
free of disputes if there is a writing. Commercial contracts are expressed
in written form for record-keeping purposes. Further, the layman, with-
out knowledge of the Statute of Frauds, manifests a lack of faith in
the practical enforceability of an oral agreement by the expression that
"it will be my word against yours." Contract making would probably
not be much different if there were no Statute of Frauds. Lawyers
generally would advise their clients to execute a written contract with
or without a Statute of Frauds.7 6
73 See, e.g., the history of CA.. Civ. CODE § 1624(5) (West Supp. 1967) on brokerage
agreements which have been progressively restricted in 1937. 1963, and 1967.
74 See generally 2 CORIN§ 279.
75 Corbin devoted one full volume out of what were then six volumes in his massive
treatise on contracts to the Statute of Frauds. This volume consists of 793 pages plus, as
of 1964, a 195-page supplement.
76 It would be interesting to see whether 'British contract practices have changed since
1954. At that time the Statute of Frauds was abolished for all transactions except those
involving surety promises and land sales. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act of
1954, 2 & 3 Eiz. 2, c. 34.
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The Statute of Frauds teaches a lesson regarding the use of the
parol evidence rule as a rule of form. Rules of form have a poor pet-
f6rmance record in Anerian law. To regard the parol evidence rule
as dt tule of form both invades and extends the scope of the Statute,
IAdeed- the Statute, has never required the entire agreement to be
bxpre8sedtin the nioranidum.77 If there is an allegation of a prior oral
agieemernt, the only rtile of form applicable should be the Statute of
Frauds. If the'tkaisaction is one required to be in writing, the questiotn
should be'whether there was a sufficient niemorandum. In parol evi-
dencd ask5 there usually is such a memorandum. The courts should
abandonr the "vary, add to, or contradict" manner of, expressing the
parol evidence rule. Fact finders should be permitted to look at all
rele/a&it vidtence in deteribining whether an asserted prior oral agree-
ment took place.78 The failure of the writing to contain the asserted
bral agreement niay tend to show there was no prior agreement. But the
fact that the prior agreement was oral should not preclude its proof.
" Although the dpplicability of rules of form to a prior oral agree-
ment, is a crucial coiisidtration, the determination of who decides
'hethet th&' agreement Was made is equally important. The use of the
parol 'Videcee rule as a jury control device must be reevaluated.
- Jdr eontrol as a rationale for the rule must be viewed with skepti-
cism because of thie minor part juries play in deciding disputes3 9 Posing
the:rule-in itS traditional form carries it over to many non-jury dispute-
resolving systems.
The rule is employed in such non-jury adjudicative processes as
adiiralty,80 equity,8 ' aha federal contract litigation:8 2 It is relevant to
77 2 CoRwiN § 499.
78 See p. 1067 infra.79 There is a decreasing use of juries in civil actions. For the year jil 159' through
Juhi 19l0, in feder I e6urt eases bed on diversity Jurisdiction, the use of juries in contract
cases crntrasted stikingli 'with that in tort cases. In the contested tort cases actually going
to trial, approkimately 9ne-fifth of the judgments were after court trial, three-.quarters were
after jury verdict, and the remaining were rendered by the court during trial. In the
contested contract case actually going to trial, however, nearly two-thirds of the judgments
were after court trial. Based on figures in U.S. Jtnso. CoNm & Din. oF AbmiN. OFF. or US.
CTs., ANN. REP. 250-51 (1960).
s6 E.g:, The Delaware, 81 U.S. 579 (1871).
Verbal agreeshdfiU, hieVer, b8&*edn the parties to a written eontfact, made
before or at the time of the execution of the contract, are in general inadmissible
to contradict or' vary its terni8, or to affect its construction, as all such verbal
agreements are considered as merged in the written contract.
Id. at 603-04 (footnote omitted). For English law, see generally 2 BarISH SHIPPING LAWS
§§ 500'10 (CbinVaix ed. 1963).
81 E.g., Makirn v. Scarbrough, 44 Tenn App, 414, '314 SW.2d 165 (1958).-
82 The folloWing cases represent government contracts disputes decided -in federal
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dispute resolution by administrative appeals boards.S8 It is inv9lved in,
trials in which the jury is waived.8 4 In England, the parol evideiice
rule is employed despite the virtual abolition of the jury system, in
civil cases""
Our system allocates to the jury the function of determining credir
bility of witnesses. Yet, jury control is given as a rationale for the parol
evidence rule. What makes parol evidence dases more difficult for 'the
jury than construction accidents, consumer injuries or gift tax cases? In
these areas the jury has been given great control.86 Why in commercial
contracts cases do we strip them of their normal credibility-determining
function? Is the jury unable to tell the honesp witness from the dis-.
honest? Is it hoodwinked by crafty lawyers? Does it decide the case based
upon emotion rather than the evidence and the. instructions of the.
judge? Does it stick the stronger party although it doubts that the agree-'
ment claimed by the weaker party was made? Doesit-disregard language
in the contract? Does the jury expect too higha degree-bf formality from
contrace makers? How do trial judges compare on these issues?-
The answers to these questions rest upon legal folklore Lnd little,
else. Much depends upon individual jurors, the judge; the parties and
the particular issues involved. There is little reliable data on any of
these questions. To justify the complex and confusinig parol evidence
rule on unproven and doubtful assumptions makes no sense,
And is the parol evidence rule the only mechanism with: which to
courts: United 5tate v. Croft-Mullins Eec. Co.,-383 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 968 (1965); Commodity Credit Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 243' F.2d 504 (9th Cir.
1957); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 215 F. Supp. O2 (D. Md, 1902); Baggett ,Tapp.
Co., 319 F.2d P64 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 1 ,, .
83 Eg., Pan American Overseas Corp. 65-1 CCH Ed. Cont. App. Dec. 4802 (1965). '
"However, even if there had been such an oral agreement (which there was not), stiih a
contemporaneous oral agreement could not be effective, to vary the .terms of the written
contract." Id. at 22,798. Reeves SoundCraft Corp,, 1964 CCH Ed. Cpnt. App. e..- - 4317
at 20,877-78 (parol evidence rules used to exclude express warranty in sale of goods).
84 E.g., DuFrene v. Kaiser Steel Corp:, 231 Cal. App. 2d'452, 41 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1964)
(semble); Mangini v. Wolfschmidt, Ltd., 165 Cal. App. 2d 192, 331 IP.2d 728 (1P58).
85 E.g., Hutton v. Wating, [1948) Ch. P98, 404; Campbell Discount Co. y. Gall, [196l]
1 Q.B. 431, 439 (C.A.).
88 Construction acddents: For a discussion of the fast disappearing privity defense for
architects see Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifica
tions, 55 CALr. L. R v. 1361, 1379 (1967). The abolitio of privity in products ,ablty cases,
W. PRossER & Y, SMrrH, CASES QN ToRTs 844-922 (3d ed. 19 . 2 ) has effectively iyen more con-
trol to the jury by getting rid of the judge-controlleq privity rule. 1Tor a discussion of
Federal Employers Liability Act, see Camnlent, The FELA and Trial by jury, -21-OHio
L.J. 422 (1960). Tax cases: Commissioner v. Duberstein, 863 U.S. 278 (1960). The .D1er-
stein case was derided initially in, the tax court, but the ,ule articulated would also apply
where the tax payer is requesting ,a refund. Such a ca~e,be brought in the district courts
(with juries) and the courts of claims.
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control juries? A trial judge who wishes to protect the litigants and the
judicial system can accomplish a reasonable amount of jury control
without such a rule.
In the federal courts and in some state courts, the judge can com-
ment on the evidence. His power to comment can materially control
the jury. Also, cross examination is a potent weapon for probing testi-
mony of questionable credibility. By giving an attorney wide latitude,
a judge can affect the jury decision in such matters. Further, a judge
can exert some control over the jury by his instructions on credibility.
The way he phrases instructions on burden of proof can, to a degree,
control the jury. If the judge makes it clear that the party asserting the
oral agreement must by a preponderance of the evidence convince them
that the agreement occurred, the party with weaker evidence will often
lose.
A judge who is firmly convinced that the jury was wrong can con-
trol them to a substantial degree by his power to grant a motion for a
new trial. Often, ordering a new trial causes a settlement or abandon-
ment of the action.
Finally, there may be many situations in which a judge need not
submit a fact question to the jury because an agreement would not be
enforceable for other reasons even if it had been made. This is the basis
for the integration theory of the parol evidence rule. Whether the
agreement was made need not be considered because, even if made, it
has been superseded by the later written agreement.
Jury control should not be the basis for the parol evidence rule.
Even if the jury must be controlled in parol evidence cases, which is
doubtful, there are other methods which are less cosily to the litigation
system.
A third pertinent consideration concerning the existence of a prior
agreement is the degree of security that should be afforded writings.
How clear is the need to protect writings from gullible or softhearted
juries or judges? In an era dominated by adhesion contracts, inequality
of bargaining power and the pervasive use of liability limitations and
exculpations, such commercial certainty should be subordinate to the
protection of reasonable expectations. The law should be more con-
cerned with protecting the actual agreement of the parties than with
protecting written agreement that appears to constitute the entire agree-
ment. Parties at least should be given a chance to prove an alleged oral
agreement.
Finally, what about convenience as a rationale for the rule? It
enables judges to avoid calling clients and litigants liars. It allows the
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judge to avoid deciding difficult issues which he does not wish to decide.
But what do we pay for this convenience? Proper issues may be missed or
ignored, and' the real reasons for the decision may not be given. Con-
venience should not be a justification for the parol evidence rule.
B. Is There any Reason Not To Enforce the Agreement?
Even if there is a prior agreement, there may be reasons why the
law should not enforce it. First, have the requirements of a valid con-
tract other than "agreement" been established? Did the parties intend
to be bound? Was the prior agreement definite enough to be enforced?
Was consent free of fraud, mistake, or duress? Was there consideration
or something else sufficient to make the promise enforceable? If there
is a required form set by law or contract, was it present? If the required
form was not present, does justice require that we disregard its absence?
Did the persons who made the prior agreement have authority to do so?
The rule may be used to protect a principal from unauthorized
acts of his agent. A contract maker wants to rationally plan and perform
his contracts. He wants to be certain that his representatives do not
make unauthorized commitments. The contracting organization can
plan and operate more efficiently if it can assume that the writing
passed among the various units of the contracting party contains the
entire commitment. From a legal standpoint, the primary means of
shielding principals from unauthorized commitments of their agents
was to give principals the legal defense that their agent or employee
lacked authority to make the commitment. But the law began to protect
the reasonable expectations of persons who dealt with these agents. As a
result, lack of authority protection became subservient to apparent
authority and estoppel.87 In order to counterattack, principals went to
contract law, and frequently included provisions in their contracts that
negated their age ts' authority to make any commitment not expressed
in writing. They also included integration clauses designed to preclude
assertion of any prior oral agreements. s8 Principals could then assert
the parol evidence rule as a defense when confronted with prior oral
representations made by their agents.80 Although it is difficult to quarrel
with rational planning or operational, efficiency as desirable objectives,
the parol evidence rule cannot be justified as a vehicle to accomplish
these goals.
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 8B (1957).
88 E.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Williams, 179 Kan. 321, 295 P.2d 672 (1956).
89 E.g., Watson-Warren Constr. Co., 65-1 CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 4867, at 23,026
(1965). In re Atlantic Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
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,First, assuming that ain authority issue is present the best method
to facc6mplish rational planning and operational efficiency is to make
certain that agents do not make unauthorized statements. Providing the
principal with: a shield against liability may in many instances inhibit
or discourage internal control of agents.
Second, hiditig an agency questiofi under the garment of the parol
evidence rule obscures, the central issue. This has been one of the
principal vices of the rule and has been used consciously or uncon-
sciously as a means, of avoiding other legal issues.,
Third,, many, prior ,oral agreements are made and intended to
survive subsequent assent to a writing. The parol evidence rule should
not be used to frustrate the reasonable expectations of contracting
parties. Nor, should it be a surrogate for a weakening lack of authority
defense.
The;-may be.other reasons not to enforce a prior oral agreement.
The. Statute of Frauds can be classified as a rule affecting the validity
of the agreement. If a writing is needed to make the agreement, valid,
the law will not nfqrce the agreement even if made. When this drastic
step is, taken, it, is done to channel contract making into written form,
to mpress upon the contracting parties the seriousness of their actions
Wand to avoid enforcement of impulsive promises.
However, ,th tendency in Statute of Frauds cases is to enforce
those oral agreements that appear to have been made despite failure to
comply with formal rules. Many techniques designed to avoid the
Statute, such as part performance and estoppel, afe premised on the
idea that they provide" evidence that the parties made an agreement.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, there is enforceability of oral
agreements to the extent of any admission by either party in the course
of litigaton.9o -In most jurisdictions, failure to assert the Statute as a
,defense is'a waiver,-The parol evidence rule shohld not be considered
as relating to validity of the prior oral agreement.
There are other more important reasons why it may be desirable
not to enforce agreements that parties have made. Here we have a true
,recognition of the need for commercial certainty. In commercial paper
disputes the maker of a negotiable note is not allowed to assert many
defenses against aholder in due course. Lenders and financing com-
panies may be entitled to rely upon a writing as a complete expression
of the entire contract. When there has been reasonable reliance by third
parties upon the apparent completeness of a written agreement es-
toppel may preclude assertion of the prior oral agreement,
90 UCC § 2-201 Comment 7.
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Still other reasons exist. Clearly the prior oral agreement would
not be enforced if it were illegal. However, there are many less odious
types of prior oral agreements. 91 Secrecy is often a reason for the written
document not incorporating the entire agreement, but the immortality
or shadiness of secrecy varies greatly. A secret oral agreement made to
avo ">, letting other salesmen know what commission was to be paid to a
part.--ular salesman may not be offensive. 92
An inflated contract price in a building contract meant to deceive a
constr"-tion lender is more offensive. The ir. !--':ant thing is to recog-
nize that these are issues that should not cor:e:rn the parol evidence
rule. 3 If these agreements are not to be enforced, it is because the law
does not wish to lend its assistance to shady or immoral deals; it has
nothing to do with the parol evidence rule.94
Even if made, and even if the requisite elements of a valid contract
are present, have the contracting parties done anything to change or
discharge the prior oral agreement? In parol evidence cases this usually
means an inquiry into the effect of any subsequent writing between the
parties. This determination is the basis of the integration concept.
Professor Corbin suggested that the rule could be characterized
as one which permits contracting parties to change or discharge a prior
agreement by subsequent acts.95 The rule, however, has existed so long
that its total abandonment is not likely even if it could be shown that it
is not needed. The most recent codification of the rule, the Uniform
Commercial Code, corrected some of the worst features but did not
abolish it. If the rule must be lived with, it should be limited to a
generally accepted and desirable objective--the protection of truly
integrated writings. If the parol evidence rule is limited solely to
protecting integrated agreements, many difficult parol evidence issues
91 E.g., Swceny v. KANS, Inc., 247 Cal. App. 2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1966).
92 Brandwein v. Provident Mut, Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693, 168
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1957).
93 In an illegal contract, whether the law will take any role may depend upon the
relative culpabil!y of the parties. If both are equally guilty, the law may simply refuse to
intervene. Some relief may be given if one party is less guilty than the other. If the con-
struction contract price is expressed as $125,000 where the real agreement is for $100,000.
refusal to listen to evidence of the prior oral agreement because of the parol evidence rule
would result in the contractor having a valid claim for the additional $25,000. If the prob-
lem is treated as one of illegality, the success of any action brought by the contractor for
the $25,000 or any action brought by the owner to recover the full contract price paid
should depend upon comparative guilt and unjust enrichment.
94 See, e.g., Note, Taxpayer Held Bound by his Contractual Allocation of Value of
Covenant Not to Complete, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1967). This note treated tax questions
only, without any need to discuss the parol e--:-1ente rule.
95 3 CoRBIN § 574.
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and subissues will disappear. There will be no need to wrestle with
consistent collateral agreements, oral conditions, oral delivery, fraud,
sham, true consideration and the like as devices to avoid the rule.
C. If the Agreement Should Be Enforced, How Should It Be
Interpreted?
Once it is decided that it is desirable to enforce the prior oral agree-
ment, it must be interpreted in light of the subsequent written contract.
Normally, this will be an attempt to fit the two of them together, but
if there is a conflict, the later expression will be preferred.
This raises the problem of subsequent written agreements expressly
contradicting prior oral agreements. The more the oral varies from the
written, the more convincing the evidence will have to be that the prior
agreement was not discharged by the subsequent agreement. But the
variation itself should not effect the provability of the prior oral agree-
ment.
D. A Rule To Protect Truly Integrated Writings
The parol evidence rule should not be:
(1) A rule of form;
(2) A manifestation of distrust of the credibility of the evidence;
(3) A method to control inefficient or irrational fact finders in the
judicial system;
(4) A device to protect those who deal with written contracts and
rely upon their completeness; or
(5) A tool to protect principals from unauthorized representations
of their agents.
The rule should be limited to protecting truly integrated writings.
V
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PAROL EVIDENC E RULE
The methods will be suggested for improving the rule. The first
is a series of proposals for tinkering with the rule which can avoid
some of its worst aspects. The second, a less modest suggestion, pro-
poses a substantial overhaul of the rule with a view toward limiting it
to the protection of truly integrated writings.
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A. Tinkering with the Rule: A Minor Overhaul
Improvement can be made within the existing structure. First,
the face of the document test for determining intention to integrate
should be abandoned. This has been done in the Uniform Commercial
Code96 and has been suggested by Professors Calamari and Perillo 7
Even with the assistance of the consistent collateral rule, the face of the
document test is simply not acceptable. A rule cannot be tolerated that
almost conclusively presumes that the mere act of assent to a subse-
quent writing discharges every earlier agreement unless the earlier
agreement can be fitted neatly into the later. Too many agreements are
partly oral and partly written for such a rule to prevail.
Second, courts might be convinced to draw a line between prior
agreements contradicting and those adding to a written agreement,
provided that an addition or augmentation to a truly integrated writing
is not permitted. This proposal would simply mean elimination of the
various tests for collateralness. It would be as if the rule were phrased,
"We will not listen to parol evidence of a prior oral agreement if it will
directly contradict a subsequent written contract."
Third, courts might be convinced to draw a line between prior
and contemporaneous agreements. Perhaps agreements made at or
about the time the written agreement is executed could be admitted.
This proposal would recognize that such changes or additions often
may not be integrated into the writing.
Fourth, as has been suggested by Professor Palmer,98 the equitable
remedy of reformation could be expanded to include not only fraud
and mistake in reducing an agreement to writing, but also the fraud
and mistake that induced a party to make an agreement. Expansion
would permit reformation where there has been a conscious omission
from the writing, subject to the "clean hands" rule.
Fifth, a rule could be suggested that would require the proponent
of an oral agreement to establish it by clear and convincing evidence,
rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence. This would be
desirable only if the rule is no longer used as a method of prohibiting
testimony that may be untrustworthy, nor as a tool to enable courts to
avoid deciding difficult credibility questions.
Sixth, courts could begin to recognize overtly that some transac-
tions are typically not integrated while others are typically integrated.
A recent study of architectural contracting practices showed that costs
96 UCC § 2-202, Comment la; but see id., Comment 3.
97 See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 63.
98 See Palmer, supra note 39.
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are almost always discissed in advance, but agreements on costs
are commonly not included in the written contract 9 9 Even clauses
which are contradictory to some of the actual agreements may not be
deleted from the contract. If this is the case, a court should not apply
any parol evidence rule to an architect-client contract, unless one of
the parties can show that this was not a typical contract and that the
agreement in question was truly integrated, Other studies of contracting
practices could furnish similar information which could be the basis
for presumption of integration or non-integration.
B. A Major Overhaul
The above proposals would help, but they would be halfway
measures adding other uncertainties to the already muddled parol
evidence rule, A line between antecedent and contemporaneous
agreements would have to be drawn, The line between adding to and
contradicting an agreement is a difficult one to draw. It is not certain
whether fact finders pay attention to burden of proof instructions.
Abolition of the face of the document test helps, but guidelines are
needed to determine intention to integrate. Clasification according
to type of transaction would help, but it would take much time and
research to make meaningful classifications.100 increased use of refor-
99 See note 57 supra.
100 What is needed is a method of convincing the trial court that the mere showing
that the transaction is, e.g., an arcliitect-employment rontract, means that prior oral side
agreei4ents are to be considered, subject to a showing that there was not true integration.
Many trial judges will want to be able to point to statutes, precedents or perhaps secondary
authority, before they will take this step.
What about a possible legislative solution? It would be possible to break transactions
down into those typically concluded by integrated writings and those which are not, The
contract formation key facts, see pp. 1065-67 infra, would assist in this determination. Such
classifications could be accomplished by empirical studies made by legislative committees
or law revision commissions. However, legislatures traditionally have not taken an active
role in solving these types pf problems. Only where certain types of transactions have
proved particularly troublesome has there been comprehensive legislative reform. Opposi-
tion by interested trade groups and preoccupation with more pressing problems would
militate against an active legislative role. At best, only a few legislatures might take such
a course and this would not be enough. If emphasis on type of transaction is to make any
real mark on American law, it must be made by the courts.
It is not likely that an attorney in specdfic litigation will try to introduce evidence of
type of transaction at the trial level. Such evidence is expensive and difficult to collect.
Also, most trial judges would consider such evidence irreleyant. If a trial court did admit
it, there would be a strong possibility of reversal on appeal. Finally it is easier to intro-
duce evidence relating to the particular transaction in question rather than evidence of
typicality.
The impetus for, and approval of, a transactional approach must come directly from
the appellate courts. Overt judicial recognition of this concept will require that:
(1) Legal scholars and attorneys must probe into reported appellate cases and demon-
strate that, in fact, courts treat different transactions differently. Examples are cases in-
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mation would be desirable, but the right to a jury trial would be lost
to the party seeking relief.
Any or all of these minor overhauls could help. However, what is
really needed is a recognition that true integration should be the only
basis for any rule that limits provability of prior oral agreements. The
desirable objectives now sought through the parol evidence rule can
be accomplished more directly through other accepted legal doctrines.
To make the integration concept Work; however, there is a need for
workable and realistic methods of recognizing the objective trappings
of a true integration. A model of a truly integrated contract should
be created and criteria developed for identification of truly, integrated
writings.
C. A Model of a Truly Integrated Contract
The hallmark of a truly integrated contract is that it is put to-
gether carefully and methodically. In this sense it resembles the crea-
tion of a statute or a treaty. A good deal has occurred before the act
of integration. The person preparing the integration, Usually the attor-
ney, gathers all the evidence of what has transpired in order to prepare
a draft. He will look at letters, wires, memoranda, agreements, con-
tracts and any other data relevant to the final document. Drafts are
reviewed by negotiators, tax advisors, patent and insurance counselors,
and technical personnel, The attorney will then prepare a draft for
submission to the other party or parties. Drafts are exchanged and
revised. Provisions are traded, eliminated or modified. Each party uses
its persuasiveness to support inclusion or deletion of specific clauses.
Language is reviewed carefully with a view toward achieving phrase-
ology satisfactory to both parties. Usually, a clause stating that the
writing covers the entire transaction is included. Attorneys look over
the final draft and confer with the top negotiators in order to iron
out final details. The final draft is prepared and the date set for exe-
volving bank notes, insurance, deeds, and separation agreement , See cases cited notd 18
supra; Egan v. Egan, - Cal. App. 2d -, 59 Cal. Rptr, 705 (1967); Degnan, supra note 53,
at 174.
(2) Using factors such as the key formation facts,, empirical studies must be made to
examine particularly troublesome transactions, with a view toward determining whether
such transactions are normally culminated by integrated writlhgs,
(3) Judges must be willing to consider these research efforts and frame their opinions
in type-of-transaction language.
(4) Even without these research efforts, judges must be willing to use their own knowl-
edge and experience to draw conclusions as to transactional typicality, and to frame their
opinions in appropriate terms.
(5) The courts must recognize the unmistakable and desirable trend in contract law
to develop variant legal rules for different types of transactions.
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cution. Top executives of the contracting parties and other interested
persons gather to sign or to witness the execution of the agreement.
Each party receives copies of the contract for distribution. The orig-
inals are kept in vaults of the contracting parties.
Obviously, the percentage of contracts made in this manner is
small. It can be argued that if we protect only true integrations of this
sort, we are in effect abolishing the parol evidence rule. But these
are the only types of written agreements which can confidently be
assumed to integrate the entire transaction in one repository.
The model presumes a large corporate contractor, but a group of
physicians, a small or medium-sized business, or a wealthy couple about
to separate might make a similar integrated contract without the re-
view of tax, insurance, engineering, patent and legal departments. It
is the care and deliberation that point to an integrated agreement.
Even a contract put together in a manner suggested by the above
model would not invariably integrate everything relating to the trans-
action. Contracts which appear to be integrated contracts may not
contain everything. Oral agreements may be made simultaneously with
the execution of a complete and final-looking written agreement, and
may nevertheless be enforceable.
D. Criteria for Determining Integration
With the model in mind, what are realistic and workable guides
that can be used to find truly integrated writings so that the parol
evidence rule can be limited to its proper function?' 0 '
101 Professor McCormick has suggested that the judge should listen to testimony of
an alleged oral agreement, consider evidence which might tend to substantiate the agree-
ment, and compare the alleged oral agreement with the writing. The judge should then
decide whether the asserted oral agreement is one which parties situated as these were
would normally and naturally have recited in the writing itself, had they made it and
intended it to stand. McCoRMICK § 216, at 441. If the judge decides that had such an oral
agreement been made and intended to stand, the parties normally and naturally would
have placed it in the writing, he should deny admissibility. He should not give the jury
or himself a chance to determine whether the agreement took place. If he decides that
had the agreement been made and intended to stand, and it would not have normally and
naturally been set forth in the writing, he should admit the evidence to the finder of fact,
whether it be judge or jury, who will decide the issue of the existence of the agreement.
Putting aside issues of lack of guidelines and of when oral agreements are normally
and naturally included in the writing, this test would probably be applied as follows:
When a witness testifies as to an asserted oral agreement, the opposing attorney will inter-
pose an immediate objection based upon the parol evidence rule. The judge would re-
serve ruling until he hears the testimony, considers the possible substantiating evidence
and compares the testimony to the writing. At this point, his views as to the existence of
the agreement can run the following range of possibilities:
(1) A firm conviction that the atgreement took place;
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In many parol evidence cases certain key facts have played signifi-
cant roles in determining how the parol evidence issue was resolved.
Evaluation of these facts will aid in spotting the objective trappings
of a truly integrated contract. Such key facts in determining integra-
tion are:
(1) Subject matter of the transaction. The more important, the
more complex, and the more extraordinary a transaction, the greater
the likelihood that it was concluded by an integrated writing.10 2
(2) Length of the negotiations. The longer the negotiations, the
greater the likelihood that the transaction was concluded by an inte-
grated writing.
(3) Adequacy of time to make the writing conform to the oral
agreement. If the asserted oral agreement is made after the final con-
tract is prepared for execution, the transaction is less likely to have
been concluded by an integrated writing.
(4) Business experience of the parties. The greater the business
experience, the greater the likelihood that the transaction was con-
cluded by an integrated writing.10 3
(2) A firm conviction that it did not;
(3) A belief in the likelihood that the agreement took place;
(4) A belief in the likelihood that it did not;
(5) No opinion either way on whether the agreement took place.
Let us first assume that the judge believes that it is unlikely that the asserted oral
agreement did occur or that the story of the party asserting the agreement is not plausible.
Putting aside his doubts, if the judge decides that it would not be normal and natural to
include it in the writing, he should admit the evidence. But if he doubts that the agree-
ment took place, he is more likely to find that normally and naturally such an agreement
would have been included in the writing and thus deny admissibility. An honest applica-
tion of a "normal and natural" test is most unlikely where he doubts the existence of the
agreement.
Now let us assume that the judge has no feelings one way or the other regarding the
existence of the agreement. Here we may get an honest application of the test. However,
the judge is more likely to deny admissibility in close cases if he applies this test. This is
due to the frequent judicial impatience with informality in contract making and a judicial
attitude which often holds contracting parties to an unreasonably high level of formality.
Also, the way the test is framed will often constitute a tie-breaker against admissibility in
close cases.
The McCormick test creates a standard for contract formation which is difficult to
apply, penalizes parties who do not rigidly conform to the standards of normal and
natural contract making and emphasizes the credibility of the testimony rather than the
contract making process.
102 However, even in very important transactions, prior oral agreements are often
made and intended to be given effect. H.K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp. of America,
367 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1966) (purchase of $3,000,000 business); Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc.
v. Doliner, 49 Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
103 E.g., TSS Sportwear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop, Inc., 380 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1967). The
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(5) Participation in the negotiations by an attorney or other ex-
perienced contract negotiators. The more active the participation by
an attorney or other experienced party, the greater the likelihood that
the transaction was concluded by an integrated writing. 04
(6) The bargaining situation. The greater the onesidedness of
the bargaining situation, the less likely it is that the bargain was con-
cluded by an integrated writing.
(7) The degree of standardization of the writing. The greater the
standardization of the writing, the less likely that the transaction was
concluded by an integrated writing.
(8) The presence of an integration clause. The presence of an
integration clause makes it more likely that the transaction was con-
cluded by an integrated writing. The likelihood is strengthened if the
clause was prominent, was called to the attention of the party who
did not prepare the writing, or was not part of a printed boiler plate.
(9) Type of transaction. If the transaction in question can be
classified as typically concluded by an integrated writing, this deter-
mination is conclusive unless the other party can show a contrary
intention in the making of the specific written agreement.
These key facts emphasize the methods contracting parties use
to put their transactions together. Three principal objections can be
made to the key-facts approach. First, this technique goes into elements
which are normally considered irrelevant, such as representation by
counsel, use of form contracts, type of transaction, and business experi-
ence. Yet, courts have frequently considered these elements whether
or not they have so stated in their opinions. The law is beginning to
awaken to the realities of the contract-formation process.
Second, the effectiveness of integration dauseg is downgraded. But
making a validly-created integration clause conclusive elevates these
clauses to a stature they do not deserve. Many times integration clauses
are buried in boiler plate. In many transactions the integration dause
will not be pointed out or discussed. There are too many instances
where oral side agreements are made and intended to be effective,
despite the presence of integration clauses. The presence of such A
clause may be quite significant, but it should not be conclusive.
Third, the use of variable key facts makes application and pre-
diction uncertain. But factors such as those discussed are the only way
court said that the complainant was a businesswoman inexperienced in legal matters., See
Sweet, supra note 25, at 905 n.150.
104 See Holm v. Shilensky, 269 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Leyse v. Leyse, - Cal.
App. 2d - 59 Cal. Rptk. 680 (1967).
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of predicting parol evidence cases. It is necessary to keep in mind that
the test is still intention to integrate. The key facts merely assist the
court in resolving this difficult question, and a proper evaluation of
the facts should improve predictability. And, if the type-of-transaction
factor is developed, some of the present case-by-case uncertainty can
be eliminated.
E. Extent of Integration
Even if only true integrations are protected by the parol evidence
rule, occasionally it may be necessary to determine the extent of the
integration. A manufacturer may be dealing with an oil supplier who
would like to supply oil to two different plants of the manufacturer.
That same manufacturer may be dealing with a car dealer for the
supply of a fleet of cars and for a fleet of trucks. The fact that the
negotiations for the oil for one plant or for the supply of the fleet of
cars are concluded by a truly integrated writing does not necessarily
preclude either party from showing a prior or simultaneous oral agree-
ment for the supply of oil for the other plant or the sale of a fleet of
trucks. There may be reasons why such oral agreements will not be-
enforced, but it is not because of any parol evidence rule. Just as the
parol evidence rule does not require that all aspects of one transac-
tion be integrated, it does not require that all transactions between
two parties be integrated when one transaction is concluded by an
integrated writing. The fpnction of the parol evidence rule does not
include telling parties how to make their contracts.
Because truly integrated contracts are made infrequently, extent-
of-integration questions will be rare. The troublesome cases have
always been the one transaction, one subject matter arrangements.
Where extent of integration is an issue, the court should apply a sub-
ject matter or transaction test. Where there is a true integration, all
aspects of the deal pertaining to the subject matter expressed in the
writing or to the transaction referred to in the writing will be inte-
grated. Whatever difficulties there are relating to extent of integration
can be eliminated if the draftsmen of the integration clause in a truly
integrated contract delineate the scope of the integration.
F. Judge and Jury
If distrust of the fact finders' ability to evaluate evidence and to
make a finding in accordance with its evaluation is eliminated as a
factor, and if it is realized that all writings do not merit special pro-
tection, then there is no need to treat the parol evidence rule more
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reverently than any other trial issue. In most cases, the jury, properly
instructed, should decide whether an asserted agreement took place.
On the question of integration, the jury should decide, after proper
instructions, whether the evidence indicates that the parties intended
a writing to be a final and complete repository.10 5 However, if the facts
are so clear that reasonable men cannot differ, the judge should apply
the parol evidence rule. If he finds that the contract clearly was inte-
grated, he should not submit the making of the agreement to the jury.
There is some difficulty in judge-jury relationships because the
integration issue is based upon intention. But it is likely that the in-
tention question will be resolved on the basis of an evaluation of the
surrounding facts and circumstances and not upon statements of inten-
tion by the contracting parties or the negotiators. Generally, intention
to integrate will not involve credibility, and the judge should .be able
to decide the question unless what happened during the negotiations
is in dispute.
CONCLUSION
We can no longer ignore the evils of the parol evidence rule.
The rule must not be expected to achieve a number of controversial
objectives. Where these objectives are desired, they can be attained by
other legal doctrines. The rule must be limited to the protection of
truly integrated writings. These writings can be identified if focus is
placed upon the contract making process and not the judicial process.
105 Cf. Meyers v. Selznick Co., 378 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966).
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